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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals in 
domestic cases by way of Utah Code Annot. section 
78~2a-3(h)(1991) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial Court erred in granting credits 
toward Defendant's Child Support Obligation for payments made 
by his father on debts of the parties? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review to be applied in this issue is 
the correctness standard, because even if there is no 
document labeled "Conclusions of Law," paragraph 2 of the 
document labelled "Findings of Fact," is clearly a conclusion 
of law mislabeled. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 
754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing in-kind 
credits toward child support obligations without a written 
and signed agreement to that effect? 
Standard of Review 
The same standard of correctness must be applied to this 
issue also, as the conclusion is one based on a matter of law 
1 
rather than a fact. Gene* al GICUJC Corp. v^ ma.st Constr. Co. . 
754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in not applying the 
Statute of Frauds to the alleged agreement between the 
parties that Defendant's father would make the payments m 
the place of Defendant? 
Standard of review 
Again the standard of correctness should be applied 
rather than that of clear error because the question is one 
of law rather than one of fact. Western Kane County Special 
Serv. Dist. No. JL v\. Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah 
1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annot. sections 25-5-4(1),and 25-5-4<2)(1989): 
The following agreements are void unl€>ss the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, 
default, or miscarriage of another; 
Utah Code Annot. section 25-5-5(1953): 
To charge a person upon a representation as to 
the credit of a third person, such representation, 
or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an Appeal from a civil Judgment and Order signed 
by the Honorable R.W. Daines, acting District Judge in the 
First Judicial District Court in Box Elder County, State of 
Utah. 
Course p_f the Proceedings and Disposition at the trial Court 
This is a case where Plaintiff filed an Order to Show 
Cause, seeking to hold the Defendant in Contempt of Court for 
his failure to make Child Support payments and the reduction 
of the back child support into a judgment. Judgment was 
entered in favor of Defendant, Jay Bradford, on the 21st day 
of January, 1992. The Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal 
on February 5, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Box Elder County, State of 
Utah. Defendant is a resident of the State of Montana. [See 
Transcript of hearing held in Box Elder County Court House, 
October 28, 1991, before Judge R.W. Daines,(hereinafter 
referred to as Tr.) page 3 and 68]. 
2. Plaintiff obtained a divorce from the Defendant in 
May of 1988, in Box Elder County, State of Utah, and 
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Plaintiff was awarded custody of the two minor children (Tr. 
at 16) . 
3. Defendant was ordered to pay child suoport in the sum 
of $150.00 per month per child(Tr. at 72). 
4. Defendant became delinquent in child support payments 
as of October 28, 1991, in the sum of $9,149.00 (Tr. at 19). 
5. Plainiff filed an Order to Show Cause in October. 
1991, seeking contempt and a reduction of the delinquent 
child support to a judgment against Defendant, which matter 
came for hearing on October 28, 1991 before Judge Daines (Tr. 
at 1) . 
6. Defendant counterclaimed an offset from payments made 
by his fnther toward the parties' bills and obligations (See 
Tr. at 71 and 75-77). 
7. The Transamerica, First Security Bank and R.C. Willey 
debts were to be paid from a $5,000.00 note owed to the 
parties on their Plain City home. The note became delinquent 
and Plaintiff sued on the note, and recovered $2,500.00 (Tr. 
at 23) 
8. Plaintiff paid the following debts of zhe parties: 
Transamerica $ 178.24 
First Security Bank $ 320.39 
R.C. Willey $1,076.12 
(Tr. at 24) 
9. Plaintiff also paid the following amounts on bills 
and obligations that the Defendant had been ordered to pay: 
Zions Bank $800.00 
Dr. Wilding $213.45 
Prescriptions $294.00 
(Tr. at 19, 20, 23 and 34) 
10. The balance of the bills of the marriage, in the sum 
of $5,551.33, were paid by the paternal grandfather (Tr. at 
24, 57, 59, 71, 76). 
11. The grandfather testified that at the time he made 
the payments on the parties bills, he was attempting to "help 
out" his former daughter-in-law and grandchildren (Tr. at 
57-59). 
12. The grandfather further testified that he did not 
expect to be reimbursed by the Plaintiff. He was making a 
"gift" to his daughter-in-law and grandchildren without 
expectation of reimbursement or that the Defendant would be 
given credit against his delinquent child support obligations 
(Tr. at 57-60). 
13. Plaintiff claimed, at the contempt proceeding that 
the Defendant had not paid $263.50 for the attorney fees on 
the divorce decree, $1,775.00 paid by Plaintiff's parents on 
obligations, $550.00 for a garbage trailer awarded to 
Plaintiff, and $1,344.00 for one-half of day care (Tr. at 5, 
12, 18, 29-30, 34, 36, 44). 
14. The trial court allowed Defendant to offset against 
Child Support the gratuitous monies paid by the paternal 
grandfather uti the parties' bills and obligations (See 
Findings of i-.ici. d«ited January 21, L992, paragraph 6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it 
credited the payments made by Defendant's father toward the 
back child support owed by Defendant. It is well established 
law in Utah that the child support arrangements cannot be 
altered without the agreement of the custodial parent. it is 
also well established that the obligor on child support 
cannot be given credit for in-kind payments. If a parent 
buys shoes for example, for the children, he will not receive 
credit toward child support, unless the obligee agrees to 
give him that credit. 
If the Office of Recovery Services were seeking 
reimbursement from the Defendant in this c.^ se, he would not 
have been given credit for the payments his father made on 
the debts of the parties, unless there were a written 
agreement, and even then it would have had to have been 
approved by the Court to be recognized as parent for the 
child support he is required to pay under the* decree. 
The statute of frauds clearly applies to the case at 
bar. The Defendant claims an agreement for his father to pay 
his obligations in child support, yet there vras no mention to 
the plaintiff that such was the intent when she was apprised 
of the Defendant's father making payments on the parties' 
debts. Such an agreement for the father to stand in the 
place of the Defendant in his obligations to the Plaintiff 
would have had to be in writing and signed by the Plaintiff 
as well as the Defendant and the father. 
Since the Court gave the Defendant credit toward his 
obligations of child support for payments on debts owed by 
both parties made by his Dad, the Court in all fairness 
should have increased that amount or reduced the amount of 
the debts to be paid by the Plaintiff by the amounts her own 
parents had paid. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING OFF-SETS TO 
CHILDSUPPORT OWED BY DEFENDANT FOR GRATUITOUS 
PAYMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT'S FATHER. THE COURT 
ALSO ERRED IN ALLOWING IN-KIND CREDITS TOWARD CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT WITHOUT AN 
EXPRESS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
It is an established rule that the obligor parent in a 
divorce situation cannot substitute benefits which he gives 
the children in any other form for the cash payments in set 
amounts mandated by the decree of divorce in any particular 
case. The Utah Supreme Court in Harris v. Harris, 14 Utah 2d 
96, 377 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1963) reiterated that rule when the 
father attempted to justify his failure to pay the full 
amounts as required by his maintenance of medical insurance 
on the children and allowing the Plaintiff to deduct the 
children on her income tax as dependents. M. . .We must 
agree with plamliii: thai the decree did not authorize the 
defendant to substitute benefits to the chilren for the 
support payment ordered by the decree, and we be believe that 
the trial court's conclusion that defendant should be held in 
contempt is supported by the law and evidence." 
In Hills v^ Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981). the 
Supreme Court struck down an agreement of the parties and an 
order of the trial court which allowed future payments of 
child support to discontinue under the condition that the 
Defendant give up his parental rights and allow the 
Plaintiff's second husband to adopt the children. The second 
husband never did adopt the children, thus t/ie Court never 
did hold a hearing as to the termination of the rights of the 
father and child support had to continue. Trie Court said ". 
. . The right to support from the parents belongs to the 
minor children and is not subject to being bartered away, 
extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the 
agreement or conduct of the parents." 
In Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule that ". . .In this 
jurisdiction alimony and support payments become unalterable 
debts as they accrue; therefore, a periodic installment 
cannot be changed or modified after the installments have 
become due." 
In Ross v^ Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court again restated the rule against in-kind support 
payments and this time emphasizes the necessity for the 
agreement of the custodial parent to such changes. 
". . . Plaintiff is not entitled, however to credit 
for expenditures made on behalf of the children or 
defendant which do not specifically conform to the 
terms of the decree.10 To do so would permit 
plaintiff to vary the terms of the decree and usurp 
from defendant the right to determine the manner in 
which the money should be spent.11 Only if the the 
defendant has consented to the plaintiff's 
voluntary expenditures as an alternative manner of 
satisfying his alimony and child support 
obligation, can plaintiff receive credit for such 
expenditures.12" 
Similar is the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Stanton v^ Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 
(1974). 
". . . The general rule is that the decree fixes 
the obligations of the parties; and that they 
cannot modify it or change their obligations by 
their conduct.9 Otherwise sometimes interfamily 
tensions and machinations could make a shambles of 
determining and enforcing the rights and duties of 
the parties. 
In the absence of any modification of the 
decree, the support money accrued in accordance 
with its terms; and it was not the prerogative of 
the defendant to unilaterally decide that he would 
not pay the support money and offset it by favors 
conferred upon the children." 
Most recent in the long line of cases reiterating the 
rule of no in-kind credits without agreement of the parties 
is the foot note number 4 in a case in which the Utah Court 
of Appeals overturns the actions of the Office of Recovery 
Services in not allowing credit where the Defendant allowed 
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his ex-wife and children live in a hoiuie he owned in exchange 
for credit toward his child support obligation and the wife 
was on public assistance. Utah Dept. of Socia1 Services v. 
Adams. 806 P. 2d 1195. 1196 (Utah App. 1<J91), 
". . .We hasten to add that the instant case is 
atypical and in no way do we lend general support 
to efforts to satisfy support obligations 
"in-kind." The agreement here concerned property 
that was easily valued and the children dearly 
received a significant surplus. Mrs. Adams had 
bargained for and acquiesced in the agreement and 
the court and th^ Department had been notified of 
i-he arrangement. Nothing in thiu opinion should 
deter the Department from taking the pusiLion it 
took here, albeit unjustifiably, in the more common 
situation where a support obligor unilaterally 
drops oj-'f -.second-hand clothes, canned I'ruit, or a 
pair of skis and then purports to deduct his or her 
view of the value thereof from support payments. 
Indeed, it may safely be said that the Department's 
fundamental position is sound—it just missed, by a 
mile, the case in which to seek validation of that 
position." 
From the foregoing discussion of relevant caselaw, it is 
obvious that in the instant case, the trial court erred 
egregiously in allowing the Defendant credit toward his back 
child support obligation for payments toward debts made by 
the Defendant's father (Findings of Fact #'s 5 and 6). There 
must be a written or at least an oral agreement for the 
obligor parent to substitute any such payments for his 
obligation under the decree to pay child support as ordered. 
If such an alteration is to be made he must confer with the 
Custodial parent and receive her acknowledgement of such a 
deal. 
In the instant case there were no written or oral 
agreements allowing any change in the way payments were to be 
made (Tr. at 25). The Plaintiff did not know of any such 
arrangement and definitely did not agree to Mr. Bradford 
receiving credit toward his back child support for the 
payments his father made gratuitously on behalf of the whole 
family (Tr. at 25). It was not until the Plaintiff sought to 
enforce her right to back child support that the idea of a 
credit even was thought of, and then by Defendant's Counsel 
as a defense to the action for contempt and judgment (Tr. at 
15) . 
The right to child support is one belonging to the 
children and should have been protected by the court in this 
situation, especially had the court found that there had 
indeed been an agreement for the child support credit to be 
made. It would obviously be to the children's detriment to 
allow their father to avoid paying his child support and also 
to default on payments on family debts as occurred in this 
case. The grandfather did not want to see his grandchildren 
left out in the cold and made the offer to pay off the debts 
without being asked and without any thought of asking the 
Plaintiff to pay the Defendant (Tr. at 57-60). In giving the 
credit for the grandfather's payments in this case, the trial 
court has actually forced the Plaintiff to repay that gift or 
loan to the Defendant by forcing her to forego back child 
support which is hers according to the divorce decree in 
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addition to the contribution that the Defendant was to make 
on the debts of the parties. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS TO THE THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE 
DEFENDANT'S FATHER MADE PAYMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
It is clear that the agreement, if indeed there were one 
by which the Defendant could obtain the substitution of his 
father for himself in his debt for child support and default 
on other obligations, would need to be in writing to binding 
on the Plaintiff in a case such as this one. Further, 
according to the Utah Court of Appeals, the agreement to 
allow credit for the payment of debts to be substituted for 
actual cash child support payments must be in writing and 
satisfy the statute of frauds. 
In Brown y. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 334, 335, 336 (Utah 
App. 1987), the Defendant tried to enforce a stipulation 
purportedly agreed to by the Plaintiff through Court action. 
The agreement provided that the alimony would be reduced and 
then terminate as also the child support would increase and 
then terminate within a set period of time. The Plaintiff's 
attorney had agreed to the stipulation, and the Plaintiff had 
never signed it. In fact she discontinued the service of her 
attorney. The Defendant never produced the writing he 
- l - ^ ^ ^ ^ a -u^^j T*~*m =Tv.f l f i^ +- ^ Kir f h n P l a i n t i f f a n d f h f i C o u r t 
stated in pertinent part, 
". . . Silence cannot be construed to be assent in 
these circumstances. For a stipulation to be 
binding, agreement by the parties must be evidenced 
by a writing which would satisfy the statute of 
frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on 
the record before a judge. The facts in this case 
do not show such evidence. Therefore, there was no 
stipulation reached between the parties and there 
is nothing for the Court to enforce." 
The court went on to say further, ". . . We will not go 
around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to create a 
stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200.00 per month by 
plaintiff . . . ." In the instant case the parties both 
state that there was no agreement between the parties for the 
grandfather to take the place of the Defendant in paying his 
child support, or for the payment of debts as a favor by the 
Grandfather of debts of the parties to cancel out the back 
child support debts of the Defendant (Tr. at 25, 71-2). 
There is only an agreement mentioned orally for the Defendant 
to repay the amounts paid by the grandfather by him (Tr. at 
57-60, 71). There being no writing as required, and there 
being no contract allowing the interposition of Defendant's 
father in his place to pay his obligations, the statute of 
frauds bars any such implication of an agreement by the trial 
court and the de facto imputation of such an agreement by the 
court giving the Defendant credit for amounts paid by his 
father on his just debts toward child support. 
Further a brief glance at the statute of frauds will 
show that an/ such agreement lor the interposition of the 
grandfather in r.he place ut Defendant In paying his child 
support or the allowance of in-kind credits would fail ity 
requirements. Utah Code Annot. :^echoi^ •":> -;> -4<:i j , and 
25-5-4(2)(1989), in pertinent part states: 
The following agreements .ire void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by i he party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement * hat by its terns is not to 
be performed within one year from the making of the? 
agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, 
default, ^r miscarriage of another: 
Any agreement whieli would require the pasuing of more 
than a year would violate the statute if not in writing. 
This was one of the reasons that the Court in Brown stated 
that the Statute of Frauds applys to child support and 
alimony agreements. Also as stated above the agreement for 
the father to answer for the debt of the son must be in 
writing and signed by the Plaintiff. 
Further the statute in Utah Code Annot. section 25-5-5 
(1953) requires a writing if another person is to be charged 
with the debt of another and would also bar an agreement such 
as that implicated by the Court in the instant situation, 
To charge a person upon a representation as to 
the credit of a third person, such representation, 
or some memorandum thereof, must be in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT 
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO PAY TOWARD PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY FEES AS ORDERED IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE 
DECREE AND THE AMOUNTS PAID BY PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS 
AND THE VALUE OF THE LOSS OF THE GARBAGE TRAILER 
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER THE ORIGINAL DECREE WHEN 
FIGURING OUT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED TO PLAINTIFF 
BY DEFENDANT AND GIVING HIM THE CREDITS TOWARD BACK 
CHILD SUPPORT 
The original decree in this case awarded the Plaintiff 
with the garbage trailer (Tr. at 31-32) which was later 
removed by the Defendant's father (Tr. at 32, 60). She paid 
to have improvements made to it and she placed a value on it 
of $500.00+ (Tr. at 33). The Trial Court disregarded this 
evidence of expense in apportioning who owed what (Findings 
of Fact, # 3). This should have been added to the amount to 
be offset by the Defendant's supposed payments. 
Defendant was ordered also in the divorce decree to pay 
a certain amount of attorney fees of the Plaintiff in getting 
the divorce (Tr. at 74). This he also failed to pay (Tr. at 
74) and this amount was also left out of the figuring of the 
Court in determing the total figure of Credits and offsets 
(See transcript at 91-97, and Findings of Fact, no mention in 
either place of the attorney fees). The Court should be 
reversed on this point and the case remanded for refiguring 
of amounts offsetting each other on this point. 
The Plaintiff's parents paid $1775.00 toward bills that 
should have been paid by Defendant (Tr. at 28-30). This 
amount was also left out of the reckoning by Judge Daines and 
15 
should also be included in a redetermination by the Court as 
to offsets (See Transcript and Findings of Fc.ct for fact that 
this also was not considered because of lack of its mention 
in either document). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Plaintiff should prevail and asks 
that the Court reverse the trial court's award of credit for 
the gratuitous gifts of Defendant's father toward the Child 
Support obligation he owes Plaintiff and remand for the Trial 
Court to enter- a judgment against the Defendant in the amount 
of back child support actually left unpaid after credit for 
whatever has actually been paid through the withhold orders 
of the Office of Recovery Services. 
DATED THIS lc^ day of ^ -jgjjj , 1992 
Respectfully Submitted, 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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